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INTERVIEW WITH
ADMIRAL GARY ROUGHEAD
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. BROWN: Okay. We can start rolling.
Admiral, thank you so much for coming.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Thank you.

MR. BROWN: What we typically do is, if you want, you go ahead and make any opening comments you want, and we'll just fire away with questions when you're finished. So with that--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: No. Thanks for the opportunity. I think you and Pamela have been trying to set this up since July, but I think the timing is fortuitous. This is, considering the weekend, about as close as you can get to the one-year point of me becoming CNO. So it's been a fast-paced year, as you would expect, and as some of you have heard me talk before, I tend to think in terms of three primary areas:

Current readiness or making sure the fleet that we have today is ready to do the work that needs to be done for the nation; the building of tomorrow's Navy, which is something I think that there's broad interest in; and then the

underpinning ingredient to everything that the Navy does and everything that the Navy is is our people.

And the past year has given me ample opportunity to be involved in each and every one of those, not just here in Washington but being able to get out and about, a couple of trips to the Middle East, visits throughout the country here, and always take great pleasure in being able to get out and spend time with ships and airplanes and the sailors who operate them all so well.

So it really has been a good fast-paced year, and in every one of those areas, I'm pleased with the support, the activity, and I'm having a good time. So with that said, why don't we just open it up.

MR. BROWN: Sure. A good place to start is your first point about current readiness.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Uh-huh.

MR. BROWN: Now we've been hearing a lot and writing about the issue of surface readiness.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. BROWN: Especially with failed

INSURVs, what's going on now with the LPD-18, 17 and 18, Vice Admiral Curtis saying, you know, we need to back to basics, calling for a strategic pause.

How did it come to this in terms of these readiness issues?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. BROWN: And what is the best way out of it?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Well, I think, first of all, to put them in context, I mean we are always focused on current readiness. The Navy that we have today is extraordinarily ready. It is a global Navy. It is operating in every part of the world as we speak doing incredible work.

If you look at the INSURVs and the ships that did not pass, there were a couple, but it is not out of the ordinary that every year we have a couple of ships that do not do well in INSURVs. The reason that we do the INSURV inspections are to assess readiness, assess material condition. That's part of monitoring the state of the Navy.

With respect to the LPDs, we have had some issues there, but, you know, we've deployed our first one and we're off and running there. So, you know, when I look at the readiness data, apart from the episodic examples that you cited, and as I visit the fleet that's out and about we're doing very good work.

Our forces are performing extremely well where they are deployed. And so I'm pleased with what I see with current readiness. There's also a dimension of readiness that goes beyond the material side, and that's what you alluded to, with regard to Admiral Curtis and getting back to basics.

He is on the right track because what he is calling for is being able to get out and exercise in what I would call the more traditional warfare skills, you know, putting weapons over the side, firing torpedoes, firing missiles, things that over the years, we, you know, for a variety of reasons have not been doing as much of, but I believe that's part of practicing our skills,

practicing our trade, assessing our competence, and we can do a lot with simulation, but, you know, the realism of weapons firings and training like that exercises the entire chain--the term I use--the entire kill chain, and I think he's absolutely right to be doing that.

MR. BROWN: Has there been an overreliance on simulation and schoolhouse training?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: I wouldn't say an overreliance. I mean we get a tremendous amount of value out of simulation. The simulators today allow us to practice things with a degree of realism that compared to some of the initial simulators that I had the opportunity to participate in or use as a junior officer, the fidelity is much greater. The beauty of a simulator is that you can make mistakes and it's not going to cost you in repair dollars or anything like that, and the two have to be used in conjunction with one another.

You want to be able to use your simulation capability to practice skills, repetitive types of

activities, and then blend in the live activities that I believe tend to add more realism because it is real, and in the case of some of our shipboard operations, it adds an intensity that you may not get in a simulator because you know the consequences in a simulator are reset the problem and start over again.

So they have to be used collaboratively, and I'm a great advocate of simulation. I also believe that using simulation for certain aspects of training are much more practical. For example, we in the Navy have been doing more and more of what we call fleet synthetic training where we are training at the battlegroup commander, warfare commander level, and to me that's an optimum use of simulation because why should you get a bunch of ships underway with a lot of sailors doing the daily tasks when the reason you're underway is to train a very limited number of people at the top echelon of command.

That training can take place in simulation so, you know, that's a good place for extensive

simulation to be used before you then take the formation out for a much more complex battle problem.

So I think how you use it is really important and we need to be making more use of simulation but never forget the fact that we have to go out and exercise the full kill chain and that adds the realism and the reality of the problem.

MR. BROWN: Do you want to add something?

MR. NAEGELE: Go back to the INSURV, you say that, you know, the readiness data leaves you confident, but the episodic data, as you referred to it, in some of these cases has been so bad and so, the degradation so extensive, that one wonders, you know, is that not showing some pattern?

How does a ship get to be in that bad shape without anybody noticing?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Well, I think it's a function of the onboard programs and oversight that you have, and every ship is not run in exactly the same way, much the same as every newsroom is not-- I'm not a newsman, but I'm sure every newsroom is

run differently.

MR. NAEGELE: No, that's true. It's true.

ADMIRAL ROUGHHEAD: So everyone is a little different. I mean some ships, you know, perform at an extraordinarily high level. Others, and most of them, tend to be in a level of high readiness and high standards, and then you're going to have some excursions where the oversight and the system and the process and the procedures is not as rigorously pursued and monitored, and that's where you get things like that.

That's why we do the inspections. That's why we do the surveys. And from that, you know, we learn.

The other thing that these also tell us, particularly when you get into INSURVs, as ships begin to age, you can begin to identify, you know, particular trends in certain areas of equipment that, okay, the, maybe this component that we procured years ago is having a harder time in the marine environment than we would like to have, and so then you're able to go back and make ship

alterations that change it.

So I mean there's what one would say is the immediate readiness assessment, readiness to be able to go out and do current operations, but by doing the INSURV program over the years, it also is the basis for us to see are the ships aging in the way that we had envisioned? Does that provide information to go back and fix things in that particular ship class?

And then we also learn, as we look to future ship classes, ways to do or not do things. So there are a lot of reasons to do it, and, you know--

MR. NAEGELE: Well, no one is suggesting you not do it, but you have no concern that there's, that the level of degradation that has occurred or has been identified in some of these INSURVs is worse than normal?

ADMIRAL ROUGHHEAD: I'm not concerned that there's a systemic readiness issue in the United States Navy, not at all.

MR. BROWN: You mentioned how this needs

to be done for older ships. Newer ships, we saw what happened with LPD-18.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. BROWN: Very recently.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. BROWN: And these aren't inconsequential things.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. BROWN: You know, cannot support embark troops.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. BROWN: What do we take this to mean for the rest of the ships in the class if this problem was ostensibly supposed to be fixed by now? What does this mean for 19, 20 and 21? And if I can add to that, we are hearing anecdotally that there is, sailors are hesitant to be assigned to these particular ships because they know they get on, they're going to be having to do a lot of extra work that should have been done before this was delivered.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah. Yeah.

MR. BROWN: How do you fix these problems and what should we think of the rest of those classes?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Well, I think, you know, as the problem was identified on the stern gate, you know, we need to take an engineering look, why did it happen? And that's something that takes place.

With respect to anecdotally sailors trying to avoid duty on the LPDs, I have not heard anecdotally that people tried to avoid those ships. They're great ships. I think you've been on them. You know that the quality of life on there is pretty darn good.

But the degree to which the ships are now complete, I think makes that concern, if there is one, a moot point.

MR. SCUTRO: Money on the waterfront, what I hear from sailors in Norfolk is that they're always having to do more with less, you know, sort of a robbing Peter to pay Paul situation, whether that's, you know, going to sea without a forward

CIWS on a DDG or, you know, paying for the GW repair on the backs of the rest of the maintenance and the rest of the fleet out in the Pacific.

If readiness is such an issue, how do you address these concerns from sailors?

ADMIRAL ROUGHHEAD: Concerns that?

MR. SCUTRO: That they're always having, they're always put in this situation of, you know, robbing Peter to pay Paul.

ADMIRAL ROUGHHEAD: Yeah. When I look at the fleet readiness data and the maintenance money that the fleets have and the percentages of maintenance that's being completed, you know, we're doing pretty good.

There has never been a year in which I have been involved in, you know, what I would call the fleet or ship business or maintenance business where you're not having to make adjustments because the operation of a fleet is a very dynamic experience, and you know the George Washington fire, regrettable, would not have wished it to have happened. It happened. That ship had to be

repaired and put back on line, so you move money to do that.

So there always will be, as you operate a fleet, movements of funds.

MR. SCUTRO: Right.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Things break. Schedules change and you have to be flexing and our fleet commanders are there, and they're the ones that make those adjustments and those decisions, but I look at the funding that has been made available to maintenance and the maintenance rates, the fleet is in good shape. I mean we, if you look at, you know, the performance of our ships and airplanes, as they're deployed, we're doing very well.

MR. SCUTRO: And back again to the waterfront in Norfolk, the other thing, any time a strike group deploys or even individual ships, I try to go down to the pier and talk to the CO.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. SCUTRO: And it seems like every time I go down there with DDGs, for example, the crews

keep getting smaller and smaller. You know it's a potential manning of 330, and I think the last DDG that I went to their deployment was like 240, you know, and you're on the record saying that the Navy needs to cut even further. How far can we go?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Well, let me clarify that point if I could.

MR. SCUTRO: Okay.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: When I talk about the Navy having to cut further, that should not be implied that I want to take all the people off of a particular ship.

MR. SCUTRO: Okay.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: What I am referring to there is the fact that we must strive to put in place the systems that allow us to reduce the crew sizes.

MR. SCUTRO: Right.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: As much as we can. I do not advocate reducing people just to reduce people. We have to be able to compensate with technology or something that needs to take place.

We have, I think, over the years, you know, have put systems on board our ships that reduce some of the more manpower intensive activities, but it really, my thrust is, as we look to the future, and as we build new ship classes, we have to bring the ship's crew down. We have to be able to backfit those new technologies into some of the newer ships so we can bring crew size down there.

I recently completed a trip that took me around the world, but when I was in Hawaii, I was on one of our DDGs, and the issue of manpower came up and the disparity between manpower. When we ran the numbers, I think there was a difference of 20 people, and those ships were in different phases of their deployment cycle.

So the numbers, we have brought the numbers down. But the ships are fairly close to one another. There will be changes based on where they happen to be. Did they just come back? Are they getting ready to go? And things like that

MR. SCUTRO: Right.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: But I've looked at it, and the Chief of Naval Personnel knows I'm very interested in making sure that we have good balanced manning, that one ship is not being arbitrarily shorted which I am convinced they are not.

MR. SCUTRO: Right. And to stay on the DDG issue, for example, the Cole, when the Cole was hit, it had 330 sailors on it.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. SCUTRO: You know, and the last DDG, you know, that left Norfolk had 240. That's a difference of 90 people.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yes.

MR. SCUTRO: When does it become a safety or a maintenance issue?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah. Yeah.

MR. SCUTRO: I mean that sweat--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. SCUTRO: --and muscle saved that ship.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah. I don't know what ship you're referring to or the numbers. When

I pulled the thread on DDG manning based on the question I had, I want to say it was like 276, and, you know, so, you know, having commanded a DDG, I want to say I came out with 292. So, you know, we're always looking at those numbers.

MR. SCUTRO: Right.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: So I mean I'd love to get into the particulars of--

MR. SCUTRO: Okay.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: --the ship and the numbers, and we can give you a better--

MR. SCUTRO: But just last on that point--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: --better case.

MR. SCUTRO: --I mean does that concern you? When you take that 90 fewer able-bodied sailors on a ship, and say it gets into trouble?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah. You know what I'd like to do is get the particulars and get the exact number because when I was in Hawaii, for example, I was told that the DDG had 220 people, and it turned out it had 200--in one case 250 some odd, and it was--so the number disparities are

there, and I'd rather talk in specifics than in generalities. I don't like that.

MR. EWING: Well, one specific number that has come up in the past few years with this issue came from the House Armed Services Committee in 2004, which said this isn't set in stone, but it kind of set as a guideline that it would like to see DDG crew size get to about 200 based on some other things they were talking about at the time.

And I wonder if you think that's a good goal for these ships, and I wonder if you have numbers that you use when you look across the fleet about what a cruiser should be, what an amphib should be, what a submarine should be, et cetera?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. EWING: In terms of getting crew sizes down?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah. The document to which you refer, I'm not familiar with, but the objective of being able to get a crew size down to 200, you know, if, in fact, we put in place those systems that allow us to remove manpower, then, you

know, that's probably a good objective, but again I caveat that with the fact that it is simply not let's take more people off and see if the ship still runs.

It's a question of what do you have to do in order to bring crew size down? What investments do you have to make in order to bring crew size down? You will not be able to get to that level of manning without making investments.

I mean that's just my experience of having served in several ships, particularly the ships to which you refer, that there will have to be increased automation. There will have to be systems put on board that reduce your watchstanding requirements, and all that is is something that must be done before you go ahead and take people away.

I'm not an advocate of saying let's put these systems on, and, oh, by the way, because they're coming take the people off. I don't go there.

MR. BROWN: Is there a spreadsheet

somewhere that actually looks at benchmarks for each ship class and where the manning needs to go--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah. Each ship has a--
-yeah, we have--

MR. BROWN: --in each iteration? Say, you know, you get a suite of electronics that come over--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. BROWN: --one or two year period, you can go this far, and then you come up with a new process that takes you this far. I mean we'd be very interested in finding out those numbers.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah. Well, I mean every ship has a manning document.

MR. BROWN: Sure.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: That you can look at. When new systems are envisioned for a ship, part of the calculus is the manning. In some cases, the manning may have to go up, but that's all part of the decision that's made with regard to the installation of a particular system.

MR. BROWN: Sure.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Because there's always a manning dimension to it. Not just in operation, but my experience has been that most of your manning on any ship is driven by maintenance requirements, not just facilities maintenance, but what I would call the operational maintenance, preventive maintenance, and things like that.

MR. NAEGELE: Be able to make the system stay working.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: I'm sorry?

MR. NAEGELE: Keeping the system working?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right. And quite frankly, you know, on many of our ships, there's a lot of facilities maintenance that goes into place, and that's a personnel driver. I mean every ship class that we have, there's a very extensive manning analysis that goes with it that determines, you know, and breaks down for those to be assigned how much time they will be spending doing various things, watchstanding, maintenance, you know, sleeping, eating, things like that.

MR. EWING: But you don't have a goal, a

class-wide goal say for a type of ship for average crew size now, and then you're not driving toward a number within ten or 15 years to go to sea per ship?

ADMIRAL ROUGHHEAD: No. I do not have that. I think as we see some of the what I would call true new manning concepts which are in the form of the LCS manning, and then the technologies that are being invested in DDG-1000, I think at that point, you then have to make the decision can they be applied in a backfit?

If they are, what is the savings manpower for that? If they are, what is the cost of backfitting them in? What's the life left on the ship? Is it worth your investment to do that? And those are things that as we go through our modernization plans that we have to take into account, and, you know, at the end of the day, you know, is it worth the investment and do you get the return on that investment on some of older ships?

MR. McMICHAEL: Admiral, why do the crew sizes continue to have to fall? Is that still

driven by the desire to drive down personnel costs? Are you feeling pressure from OSD to continue pressing--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: No, I mean, my, there is no question. I think anyone who is in any type of business would probably agree that the personnel costs are high. You know whether you're in the public sector or the private sector. When you start, you know, factoring in the salaries and the health care and everything, and it is becoming, you know, people are very expensive.

They're our most precious commodity. I wouldn't expect it to be otherwise. But you also look at demographic trends and so it is in our best interests to reduce crew sizes, and it is also, I think in terms of combat efficiency, you know, can you bring the number of operators down and still perform the same functions, it's in our best interests to do that.

MR. FARAM: Taking manning or taking manpower to a different level, in the Navy for the last few years, it's been bringing down end-

strength, and normally at the end of the year, you kind of come in last few years below the congressionally mandated level.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. FARAM: This year you're nearly 5,000 above.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. FARAM: At this point. Is that a designed effort to give yourself a little cushion with some of drawdown?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: No, I think they're, you know, as you alluded to, at the end of every year, you predict based on historical data and performance, you predict where you believe your end-strength is going to be.

We have been enjoying good retention numbers, low attrition rates. I would also say that anecdotally that I believe that there are many young people who, I mean they enjoy what they're doing and they're staying with what they're doing.

But I think the economic concerns that people have is also shaping that departure at the

end of the year.

MR. FARAM: We heard that there was some ideas on the table to possibly try to plus the force up right around 5,000 level just because there are GWOT requirements and the strain that it pulls on other commands and the system to be sending this many sailors, you know, to support the real world missions over there. But that since you had the ability to be up there with how Congress allows you to go up a little ways, that it was a conscious idea.

So what you're saying is this--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: A conscious idea to go high?

MR. FARAM: To stay high and kind of start easing out of this drawdown.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. FARAM: Because you are in the flattening out curve portion of that.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah. I mean we, we were, you know, had the target to flatten out. But we are seeing the behavior being different than

that, and that's what's put us over this year, and I think it's a combination of meaningful work and is there an economic dimension to it? I think that might be it as well.

MR. NAEGELE: So the bad economy is driving more people to stay in the Navy?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah. That economically young people who would normally be leaving the Navy and seeking a job on the outside are perhaps waiting to see how things sort out.

MR. NAEGELE: So do you see that having an impact then on other retention programs and on recruiting? Will recruiting get easier? Will the need for retention bonuses decline?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: We'll see, and you can't just look at it in the aggregate either. You have to look at what are the skills? Was it that, what areas of the Navy are still not affected by perhaps the job market on the outside? And so how you address those is something that is always looked at, and as we look at our retention policies, incentives and what have you, we have to

adjust based on the behavior of the force.

MR. CAVAS: On a totally different sort of topic.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Okay.

MR. CAVAS: You maintain a prioritized list of about ten strategic issues, what's important on your mind.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. CAVAS: What are you trying to accomplish and all of that.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. CAVAS: I understand number three on that list is force structure. I understand above that, one, two and three are naval aviation issues.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. CAVAS: Of course you have the strike fighter--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. CAVAS: --gap in there. Could you speak about your top concerns with naval aviation right now and the things that you'd like to see changed, particularly as you're going into work on

the POM-10 and the budget and the QDR and all these other issues that are in play right now?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah. Well, the first thing I would say about naval aviation is it is an incredible capability for the nation. Over half of the fixed wing missions in Iraq are flown by naval aviation. Over 40 percent of the fixed wing missions in Afghanistan are flown by naval aviation. So the fact that we have a naval air arm is a good thing for the country, and they're doing great work over there.

But as I look at naval aviation, a couple of things are important to me and we have been looking at very carefully, and it's the strike fighter shortfall that I've spoken of on several occasions.

Hornets are aging out. Some of the initial Hornets that we purchased are reaching the end of their service life, and they've served us well, but they have to pass from service. And as that happens, starting in 2016, we begin to see a drop in our inventory that will last for around

eight years, and it will affect the flexibility that we have with regard to rounding out the air wings for the carriers.

The lowest it gets is about 70 airplanes. So, you know, that to me is something that as we get into the future budgets, we have to make sure that we're covering.

MR. NAEGELE: The lowest it gets is 70 airplanes for what?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: For strike fighter airplanes, that the inventory that we would need to maintain the Air Wing Fleet Response Plan.

MR. BROWN: How many wings is that?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: For us, it would be ten, ten wings, and that's what we're trying to keep moving.

MR. BROWN: Okay. You want to stay with ten wings?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right. Yeah. So how, you know, you get to the point where if the inventory becomes too low, you then are moving airplanes among squadrons, and it just--when your

inventory starts to go, you lose that flexibility.

MR. NAEGELE: When you said 70, just to make sure I understand, that's 70 per wing?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: No, no, no, no.

MR. NAEGELE: 70--a shortage of 70 aircraft?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Well, actually the number is 69, but I round it to 70 just for simplicity sake.

MR. CAVAS: 69 below where you want to be?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Where you would want to be to be able to keep the--

MR. NAEGELE: Thank you. Okay.

MR. CAVAS: That's the greatest--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. CAVAS: --that that shortage gets?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: At the present time, we are seeing it at 69 airplanes. So, you know, to me, that's an issue that we have to address. The Joint Strike Fighter is what pulls you out of that shortfall, but, you know, there have been some who have said that the, that if we were to continue

with Hornet production, that there would be concern that we were, you know, walking away from Joint Strike Fighter.

That's not the case at all because I really do want our air wings to have more than one type of airplane. As we saw with the Air Force, when they had to ground their entire fleet, that was really problematic.

And, in fact, we moved an aircraft carrier. We put several squadrons on prepare to deploy orders in order to back that up. So, what I envision in the future is an air wing that will have a mix of F-18 Super Hornets and Joint Strike Fighters.

And then when the Super Hornets phase out over time, and this is long after we're no longer writing about this stuff, but maybe still able to read about it--

[Laughter.]

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: --we'll then replace it with a sixth generation fighter, and now you'll have JSFs and a new fighter, and that's how I

believe that we need to position ourselves so that we always have a mix of strike fighters on the decks of our aircraft carriers.

MR. BROWN: If you're moving forward with production of a 4.5 generation Hornet, don't you have to reduce the JSF buy, if only by a little? Your planned JSF procurement?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Well, right now, we're looking at what our options should be to address this strike fighter shortfall, and how we do that is what we get paid to do as we churn on the budget.

MR. MURADIAN: Some say you should accelerate the JSF?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Is that, is that, you know, that's an option that has to be looked at.

MR. NAEGELE: Do you have a preferred option?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Uh? Do I?

MR. NAEGELE: Do you have a preferred option?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: We're in the process of

working our way through this. It's not easy stuff. But, you know, that's what we're looking at as we go forward.

MR. CAVAS: What are you waiting for for that? I mean I'm sort of asking the question here that we're in the process of working our way through this. This has been, this subtopic was broached some time ago.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. CAVAS: And there's been an ongoing analysis, and I'm not quite sure how much analysis you can do on an issue.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. CAVAS: The problem is laid out.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah, well, I think there's the question of analysis and then how do you apply the resources.

MR. CAVAS: You asked this year, of course, Congress for permission to drop to ten carriers for the 33 months between the Enterprise comes out of commission and a replacement comes along.

There's a lot of talk that that number of 11 carriers, we're going to see that change in February. There's a big push going on now coming from a number of quarters to make that ten carriers, which of course would give you the option of cutting a wing, which of course would make your strike fighter issue--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. CAVAS: --whether it's JSF or 18--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. CAVAS: --a whole lot easier. How committed are you to the current force of 11 aircraft carriers?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: I'm currently committed to the current force of 11 carriers.

MR. CAVAS: What does that mean though, "I'm committed"? As long as we have it or does that mean for now or forever or?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: No. I believe that if you want to be able to be the global Navy that I think the nation needs, 11 carriers allows us to run the response plan in the way that we have, and

I believe 11 carriers is the number that we should have.

The desire to go to ten temporarily is because of Enterprise, fuel, cost of maintaining, the availability of shipyards to do the work that would push her for another deployment. So our desire to drop below 11 is, indeed, simply a temporary measure, but I believe if we are to be the global Navy that this country needs for our safety, security and prosperity, 11 carriers is a good number to do that.

MR. CAVAS: So you're committed to the carrier force--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: I am.

MR. CAVAS: --as currently envisioned in the 30 year plan?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right. Right.

MR. CAVAS: And you're committed to keeping the number of wings--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. CAVAS: --as they are?

MR. NAEGELE: What happens if you're told

no dice, we just spent \$700 billion to bail out Wall Street so we can't afford 11 carriers?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right now the law says I should have 11 carriers. I believe there should be 11 carriers. If that law changes, I obey the law.

MR. NAEGELE: Well, I think what the next president would ask you is what is the strategic impact on the nation if we lose that carrier?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah, the strategic impact of reducing the number of carriers is reducing the responsiveness of our carrier force. That's what the strategic impact is. If there is a decision that the risk associated with that is acceptable and the law says you're going to have ten carriers, then we'll follow the law. But, you know, that's a discussion and a decision that would have to take place.

MR. NAEGELE: I guess what I'm looking for is are there dire circumstances or is, well, there would be a little more risk? I'm not hearing there are dire circumstances from your response. I get a

more the law says 11 and I think that's the right number.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Well, I mean--

MR. NAEGELE: If somebody said look, if we cut one carrier, cut one wing, we solve this problem, we save "x" number of dollars, we save "x" number of sailors, and what is the risk to our nation, can you quantify that in any way?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: I believe it's a question of the need to respond and to have the presence that's required for our safety, security and prosperity.

MR. NAEGELE: Can you quantify that? I'm looking for something that we could latch on to, that, you know, this is what the impact would be?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: As I said, the impact would be you would not have the flexibility and the depth to be able to respond to crises in several places in the world. The decision would have to be made at the strategic level if there were certain areas that that was okay.

You know I can tell you that, you know,

with a carrier force of 11 and the way that we are operating that force, that I can produce six carriers in 30 days and one to follow in 90 days. That's the way that we're set up right now.

Those six carriers allow you to service the combat that's going on in the Middle East. It allows us to cover our presence in the western Pacific. It allows us to have a rotation plan for those carriers that allows the dwell and the home tempo for our people.

You start reducing numbers, you begin to affect all of that, and the decision then has to become is that what the nation wants? I mean I can't, I'm not going to give a hypothetical, you know.

MR. NAEGELE: But I think you're getting closer to what we're driving at. If, in that case, if you reduce by one, does that go to five carriers in 30 days and one in 90 days or does the reduction by one actually make more of a dent in that picture?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: I mean you have to then

look at, you know, can I stretch out the number of, can I lengthen deployments? I mean this is not just an either/or question because it gets to home tempo dwell for people. It gets to how much time that you're operating in an operational state. That gets to longevity of the fuel on the carriers. I mean there are a lot of factors that come into this.

So simply saying, you know, we're going to drop ten carriers, you know what is the risk? I mean there are several. There are personnel risks. There are operational risks. There are life cycle risks. And all that has to be taken into the calculus. So, to say, you know, what does it mean, it means a lot, and so how do you make the decision if you wanted to do that and where are you willing to take the risk?

MR. MURADIAN: If I may, this strategic question that you mentioned, sir, on the week of September 8, the Chiefs met for several days to sort of map out what the threats are going to be that the next administration is going to have to

deal with, you know, a fairly involved process.

I was told you guys met several times. It wasn't just sort of over a pizza and you sort of figured out what the challenges and the threats were going to be.

ADMIRAL ROUGHHEAD: There was no pizza there.

MR. MURADIAN: No pizza there.

[Laughter.]

MR. MURADIAN: Admiral Mullen doesn't like the pepperoni apparently.

ADMIRAL ROUGHHEAD: Yeah.

MR. MURADIAN: What were the top five things that the next administration is going to have to look at, strategic threat and challenge-wise up there? Is it China, you know, Russia, Korea getting wackier? You know, we project Iraq, you know, another two years, you know, Afghanistan, another four. What was sort of that template that the next guy, whether it's McCain or Obama, is going to have to deal with?

ADMIRAL ROUGHHEAD: The, you know, I would,

we did meet, but I wouldn't say that we had top fives and specific things. I think the issue that we need to address is what environment does the future hold; what is the nature of warfare in the future?

We're seeing a degree of what some might call irregular warfare, and what does that mean for force structure? You know there are some who think that you have regular warfare and irregular warfare, and you have to have different forces for those.

My view is that there is warfare, and at one end is regular and the other end is irregular, and sometimes they both bleed into one another, and the challenge for us is in the Navy to look at how do you design your force and what capabilities do you need that allows you to cover the entire spectrum of warfare?

And my view is for the Navy, and I'm not speaking for the other services because that's their responsibility, that our force should be a force that can cover as much of that spectrum as

possible, that we can employ that which we have as broadly as possible. You are going to get at each end some forces that are very specific, very tailored to a particular task, you know, you have to have SEALs at one end.

MR. MURADIAN: High end, China?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: And then you can think of high-end systems and the more traditional kinetic effects that we have at the other end.

But at the end of the day, what we must do is to ensure that it can be employed across as much of that spectrum as possible with the fact that there are going to be some things that are really specialized on either end.

So, you know, the fact that, for example, we can take an amphibious ship and use it in its traditional amphibious role or that we can use it as we're using it off of Haiti in disaster relief right now, the fact that, you know, our sailors can perform across that spectrum of warfare. We have machinist mates who are operating in the desert now in Iraq doing different functions. So how do we

design the force so that we can cover as much as possible?

I think that's the best return on the investment that we make. So, you know, that is where I believe our discussion has to take place and then we design the force accordingly.

There are, you know, a lot of issues that have to be addressed. We are engaged in Iraq and we are engaged in Afghanistan, and we are supporting the fight there. As I said, you know, our carriers are providing a significant amount of airpower in Central Command. Our P-3 airplanes which can do great antisubmarine warfare are also great ISR birds in Iraq.

So, you know, on one hand, you'd say, well, is the P-3 a regular warfare or is an irregular warfare? It's both. And that's where I think we really need to try to make sure that that which we buy and how we use it maximizes that broader spectrum of conflict, and so that's, you know, those are the discussions that I have with my staff and that's where we're looking to see and how

do we maximize that?

Because we're going to live in a very complex world. I mean the term asymmetric warfare used to, at least to me as I was coming along, that was kind of the unconventional stuff, but we're finding, I find asymmetry across that whole spectrum.

MR. MURADIAN: Across everything China is doing and a lot of what Russia is doing.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right, and I would say that the use of a sophisticated anti-ship cruise missile by Hezbollah is asymmetric warfare kind of in the reverse. So that's where I think a lot of our discussions have to take place.

MR. MURADIAN: Or Chinese ballistic missiles that you can't shoot down that can jeopardize the carriers.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Or any sorts of developments like that. So how do you address those?

MR. CAVAS: The pacing threat Vago just alluded to has been used apparently as the primary

justification, in public anyway, for truncating the DDG-1000 program.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. CAVAS: And the surprising statement that the DDG-1000 doesn't do air-to-air defense which a great many people are still trying to understand.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. CAVAS: It makes very little sense to almost everybody I've talked to.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: That our statement that it can't do it doesn't make sense?

MR. CAVAS: Right. Whatever the explanation is, there are multiple explanations out there.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Okay.

MR. CAVAS: I don't know which one is right.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. CAVAS: I'm just a piano player; what do I know?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. CAVAS: But there are a lot of explanations out there and there's not commonality in that.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Uh-huh.

MR. CAVAS: But this threat apparently has said, well, this is not a viable ship. Sort of in line with the aircraft carrier issue is, well, is the aircraft carrier now terribly viable?

You're the former Pacific Fleet Commander, and you're quite comfortable with all the issues in the Pacific.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Uh-huh.

MR. CAVAS: Is the carrier, you know, if the DDG-1000 can't do anything to help itself now--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. CAVAS: --and it's not the ship we need, is a carrier still a viable platform for something say for the defense of Taiwan? Or is something now that has had to pull back so far that this is no longer relevant? I mean I'm taking this DDG-1000 argument beyond--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. CAVAS: --where it is.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Well, as the former Pacific Fleet Commander, I will tell you that carriers are extremely relevant.

MR. CAVAS: But are they still effective?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: And the use of those carriers--yes, absolutely, without question. The striking power that comes off of a carrier, the sea control capacity that exists on a carrier, there is nothing like it in the world. You know, talk to the soldier on the ground in Afghanistan, and tell him a carrier is irrelevant--

MR. CAVAS: Sure, but we're talking--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: --and he won't agree with you on that.

MR. CAVAS: --about a contested area where this threat, this pacing threat--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. CAVAS: --is present--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. CAVAS: --whether in the hands of China or as Admiral McCullough talked about--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. CAVAS: --nongovernment--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right. But you can't simply look at--

MR. CAVAS: --entities.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: --a single entity and say, you know, it's irrelevant. If you look at operating carriers at sea or even in close proximity, I mean there was a time when people said you'd never put an aircraft carrier in the Arabian Gulf.

MR. CAVAS: Sure.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: And I think we've capped out at--what--five or four or something?

MR. CAVAS: Right. And when the Ranger went in in 1991, that was the first time a carrier had ever been there; right.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: So, you know, the carriers just give us tremendous flexibility. I highlighted the fact that when the Air Force had to ground their airplanes, you know, the ability to move that air power as quickly as we did, you know,

that's what the carrier gives you.

The fact that we operate our carriers in the Pacific, in the Atlantic, wherever it may be, and the rest of the fleet that we have built around that carrier, allows us to operate it in ways that I consider it to still be a very, very valuable instrument of our national power.

And it's a question of the, you know, the ASW problem. We have submarines to deal with that. We have maritime aircraft to deal with that. We have ships that are very good in open ocean anti-submarine warfare. We have area defense systems.

The issue for me with the DDG-1000 is it protects itself. That's, you know, that's what it does and it is a gunship. It can shoot a bullet, you know, about 80 miles.

MR. CAVAS: So it only has a point defense system.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: It has a point defense system.

MR. CAVAS: Have you had a capabilities brief on the DDG-1000 since taking over as CNO?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: I have.

MR. CAVAS: You have?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: I have.

MR. CAVAS: Of course, Raytheon has been actively pushing the efficacy of their system on the DDG-1000.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. CAVAS: Saying a number of things. And there are, there's an awful lot of politics here, and almost everybody has a vested interest. There is almost--and I'm not sure that there is a straight player in this story. Everybody has got an angle one way or another.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. CAVAS: However--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: But I would say that I'm the one that has to make the decision of what I consider to be best for the Navy.

MR. CAVAS: Sure. Fair enough. Absolutely. But--

MR. NAEGELE: So this has been sort of a mistake all along?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: I would say that--

MR. NAEGELE: Pursuing this--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: --DDG-1000 was conceived in the early '90s. The world has changed a lot.

MR. CAVAS: Does this speak to the problem, overall problem in ship design, that it takes so long to put a new design, to work up the requirements, design it, engineer it--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: It does take us an awful long time.

MR. CAVAS: --develop it, and that you have an enormous risk that by the--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Absolutely.

MR. CAVAS: --time you get there and you're ready to build, now after all this money and all these years and all this effort, it's just not the ship we want?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: In the case of the DDG-1000, that's the decision that I've made because you know it has been optimized for a particular mission. It has, you know, I mean--

MR. CAVAS: So there was no real DDG in the DDG-1000?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: It has missiles on it, but those missiles are really for self-defense.

MR. MURADIAN: It's awful DDish?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: It is.

MR. CAVAS: Well, that's what a Sprue-can [ph] was, I mean ultimately with the VLS.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. CAVAS: Can Aegis, the alternative now to DDG-1000, the DDG-51 Aegis System, can this meet the pacing threat? Is this capable of meeting this pacing threat?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: I consider it to be capable of meeting the pacing threat.

MR. CAVAS: You do consider it be capable of meeting it?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. CAVAS: Okay.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: There will come a point in time when there will be new systems, new developments, as there has been throughout history.

MR. CAVAS: On the part of the pacing threat?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: On the part of the pacing threat. On the part of technology that, you know, things will change. I mean if you go back in time, the genesis of Aegis really came with the advent of the anti-ship cruise missile, that and large formations of airplanes.

MR. CAVAS: Backfires.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah. I mean that's what drove Aegis. The issue with respect to the DDG-1000, it is defined to provide fire support in a littoral environment and operate in littorals. The fact of the matter is that the proliferation since the early 1990s, for example, if you go and look at ballistic missiles, I think in 1990, there were about nine countries that had ballistic missiles. We're now to 26 or 25 that have ballistic missiles.

So, you know, that proliferation has taken place. The number of countries that have expanded, and even not just countries but organizations that

have access to anti-ship cruise missiles, you know, and I think some of you heard me say this before, you know, who would have expected five years ago that Hezbollah would have 802s. They do. I mean that's life. That's what's happened.

And so when I looked at all of that, you know, we have to be able to operate in those contested environments. You know we're not going to get a freebie, and so we have to be able to go in and provide the combat capability that gives us the access and allows us to generate the sea control or the power projection, and the fleet has to be able to do that. And so that's what drove my--

MR. FARAM: Shifting gears just a little bit, we'd like to talk a little about uniforms.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. FARAM: I know you're a wear-tester for the service dress khaki.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. FARAM: What do you think of that uniform so far wearing it and is it something--you

in the end will have to sign off on whether it comes back or not.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right. Yeah.

MR. FARAM: But what are your thoughts as a wearer of it so far?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah. Well, there were some features of the uniform that as I wear it that--you know, and that's why we do the wear test--I mean the shirt that came with it I think is not a good enough quality to represent the rest of the uniform. Because we were using or wearing some, you know, a limited number, some of the tailoring, but that's an easy fix.

The issue for me on any uniform, whether it's the new enlisted uniform, the service dress khaki uniform or PT uniforms, it really comes down to utility, practicality and cost. And we take in the account of the wear test, and for me I will consider, you know, those three factors and make a decision as to what the applicability of that uniform should be for the Navy.

The one thing that I have found is that,

that the whole uniform enterprise is a very expensive one. When you say you're changing the uniform, a particular uniform, for the entire United States Navy, you're talking about a lot of folks, and it's a lot of money.

You are also--and something that I take into account is the individual sailor's pocketbook because even though there are allowances that are provided and what have you, at the end of the day, you know, we pay, you know, to maintain our uniforms and so that's another factor.

I mean there's the initial cost factor that the Navy has to deal with, but then I also think about what does it mean for the individual sailor, and how much will it cost to maintain those uniforms?

MR. FARAM: You've got a big rollout scheduled to begin in January with the new Navy working uniform, which is for everybody in the Navy.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Uh-huh.

MR. FARAM: Is that effort still on track,

and do you support the full implementation of that?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: I do. Yeah.

MR. FARAM: How do you see the--a lot of sailors look at this, the other services going to and from work wearing--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. FARAM: --their BDUs, stopping off at the grocery store--and a lot of sailors don't do that in dungarees now--it's strictly to and from--are kind of hoping for a little bit of, you know, an easing of the rules. Do you see those types of things in the future for this type of uniform giving sailors a little more flexibility?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah. I mean we'll look at what the policies are and, you know, it's quite possible that certain locales may have some different provisions than others. I'll tell you, you know, where I come down is that I think those who are wearing BDUs, the ones that need to wear them are the ones that need to wear them, the ones that are involved in operations that require that uniform.

So, you know, every place and every uniform will have a rule set associated with it that we'll provide to the fleet, and then we'll enforce the uniform standards that are there to identify our professionalism and the uniformity that is part of being in military uniform.

MR. SCUTRO: Sir, if we could just go back to Norfolk for a second. You know, IA duty has evolved to the point where sailors--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. SCUTRO: --tell me it's inevitable, it's going to happen, you might as well volunteer, and, oh, by the way, the ones that come back and do it love it, you know.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. SCUTRO: They come back with tremendous respect for the Army, and I really--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. SCUTRO: --for a lot of them, it's a very positive experience. But as we start drawing down forces in Iraq, you know, and combat brigades start coming out, will we maintain the requirement

for IAs, boots on ground, in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, or can we expect to start telling sailors, okay, get back to being sailors?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. SCUTRO: And you don't have to have this in the back of your head all the time?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: No, I'll just, you know, say what I say whenever I do an all-hands call wherever it may be. I tell our sailors, you know, we're going to be doing this for at least a couple more years. As you may know, we're transitioning from Individual Augmentee to GWOT Support Assignment, to try to get some increased predictability into that process.

We're also very mindful of some of the second, third order effects. You know, for example, as an IA, if you're coming from an overseas location, you still remain covered by SOFA, Status of Forces Agreements, because you're only temporarily gone. Your family is still there.

What we know is that if you're in GSA and you transfer out, then that SOFA coverage ceases.

So we've made some adjustments and we're handling the detailing of folks that are there differently.

But I believe GSA will give us greater predictability, and as you've seen, and as you've mentioned, those who come back and those who I see in the field that are performing IA, and on my last trip I was seeing more and more GSA sailors there, really are very fulfilled by the work that they do and the contribution that they feel that they're making, and the awareness that they gain with working with another service is, I think, is extremely valuable for us and for them.

I mean for us I'm meaning the Navy. As you have also seen, those who do these assignments and now that we've been doing it long enough, we know that promotion rates are higher for sailors that do IAs or GSAs. The boards recognize that.

The incentives and the provisions that we've put in there are advantageous to the records so that there are some points associated with them. I also believe that we have established and we remain very mindful of the implications of serving

in those assignments as it may apply to advancement exams and things like that, and I think we've done a very good job of putting in place policies that don't disadvantage anyone with regard to promotability and time in grade and things like that.

So, you know, what we have done with IAs and GSAs is we have brought the skills and the competencies of the American sailor into the fight in a very, very positive way.

What we bring, the diversity of our talent, the drive we have and just our culture has made a difference, and there are some areas in particular. The one that most comes to mind is in, for example, going against IEDs. You know we in the Navy know how to live in an electronic environment.

We know how to maximize it for our use and we know how to deny others the use of it, and we have been able, for example, take that competency and make a huge difference and save lives.

MR. CAVAS: The prowler guys.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: With prowler guys, but others. I mean EW techs that have become part of some of the units that are in Iraq, and you know, you talk to those soldiers and they know that they are directly saving lives, and that makes, you know, I mean you cannot get a better sense of satisfaction than that.

So, you know, I think our whole IA process, the attention that we've devoted to it, and the other thing that we also pay attention to is that when you come back on a deployment with a squadron or a ship, you know, you're still coming back as a unit, and when our IAs come back, the attention and the focus on them, as they come back with a very unique example, that no one in their command may be able to identify with, how do you best integrate them in?

How do you best have in place those systems and procedures and processes that allow you to perhaps detect when a young man or woman is having a little bit of difficulty? And those are things that we continue to work on, bringing those

groups together.

In fact, tomorrow, at the Navy Yard, we're doing an OPNAV IA Appreciation Day where we're taking the IAs that have come out of commands in the Washington area to just bring everybody together, have their families there, and just spend a little bit of time with them.

MR. SCUTRO: But broadly IA is basically a permanent part of being a sailor now?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Or I would say GSA.

MR. SCUTRO: GSA--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: I think we need to start, you know--

MR. SCUTRO: --is a permanent part of being a sailor?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah, for the near, you know, the term I use, for the next few years, next couple of years.

MR. SCUTRO: Thank you.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Because we're contributing to the fight. It's an important fight, and if we have the means to make a

difference, that's where we're going to be.

MR. MURADIAN: How, if I may, and I know the time is short, but one question which I had is how hard has it been for you, as a CNO, with a Chairman who is a former CNO and a Deputy Defense Secretary who was a former SECNAV, to be able to do what it is you feel is right--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah.

MR. MURADIAN: --to do for the Navy? I mean one of the things I was told was on the DD decision, there was some pushback that you received from other quarters, including perhaps the RD&A, former RD&A, who is now the Acquisition Chief.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Uh-huh.

MR. MURADIAN: How do you get your agenda through--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Okay. Well, the first-

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MR. MURADIAN: --as you see it?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: The first thing I would say is no one has been more mindful or more supportive of me as Chief of Naval Operations as

Mike Mullen. And I'm extraordinarily grateful for that because I think what you're identifying is a dynamic that can be at times awkward.

MR. MURADIAN: Right.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: That is not the case. And with respect to Gordon England and John Young, professionalism and openness is how I would characterize the discussions that we have had. Will there--you know, in everything that we do, and it doesn't make any difference if we're, you know, talking about acquisition issues or personnel issues, you know, people are going to have opinions and positions.

And the beauty of our system and the professionalism and the openness with which we discuss it, you know, that's what makes us a better organization. So, you know, I have no qualms, reservations or anything about the relationship that I have, and, you know, as you may know, I served directly under Gordon England.

John Young was RDA when I was doing legislative affairs. He had extensive Hill

experience and I'm grateful for the insight and the counsel and the mentoring that he gave me, you know, as I dealt with that. So, you know, anyone that wants to read into or imply that there's any kind of, you know, wrestling match going on is wrong.

MR. HOFFMAN: Quick question here. Mike Hoffman, Air Force Times, and we've been reviewing a lot with our nuclear issues.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Uh-huh.

MR. HOFFMAN: And the Air Force has been compared to the Navy in quite a few of the task forces even having Admiral Donald do his review.

I was just wondering if the Navy has taken a look at their policies and procedures and if you guys were concerned as well of the possibility of losing that focus on the nuclear mission of the Air Force?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Well, I think, you know, in our case, our nuclear mission is really very much confined into a particular community. And the facilities that we have are extraordinarily

well maintained, well run. You know we always in everything we do need to be looking at our process, our procedures, and we do that.

We have our Strategic Systems Program Office who has the bead and the dot on that but, you know, for me, the nuclear dimension of what we do is extraordinarily important. We have very, very competent officers in charge of it, but you always need to be making sure that everything is being done properly, that the qualifications are where they must be, but you also have to be looking at how are we grooming the next generation and are we bringing people up in the right way. So we're doing that.

The other aspect that we have in the Navy that because it's our nuclear capability resides predominantly in our submarine force is that the discipline, the standards, the processes associated with operating the largest number of nuclear power plants probably of any organization in the world is all part of that ethos, if you will.

So, you know, and you're well aware of the

standards that we hold our nuclear operators to. So we have a, I think, a very well confined nuclear enterprise, but we don't take it for granted.

MR. HOFFMAN: Are you considering any changes? I mean the Air Force is considering a wide range of organizational changes and taking a relook at their policies and procedures. Is the Navy going through that same process right now? Are you guys going to stand pat and say we're still doing a great job here?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: No. We're looking at it and I've, you know, recently codified that I want the Director of the Navy Staff to, you know, to provide the oversight over, with a headquarters function of that.

MR. HOFFMAN: Okay.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: So, you know, is that an organizational change or procedural change? But it really is an enterprise that we take very, very seriously. It has to be operated to exacting standards and that's what we're going to be doing and what we have done.

MR. McMICHAEL: But the organizational change wasn't as a result of the Air Force's problems? Is that separate from that?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: We, I mean we looked at our whole nuclear enterprise, and when we looked at it and we looked at my staff, I, you know, we have really evolved the position of Director of the Navy Staff, and I want it clear that the Director of the Navy Staff will be the one for OPNAV that would be looking at that.

MR. McMICHAEL: But did you initiate that as a result of the Air Force's problem?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: We initiated it as a result of a review that was, that was done within our Strategic Program Office.

MR. HOFFMAN: When was that done?

MR. NAEGELE: Prompted by the Air Force thing? I mean that was the impetus?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right. We looked at it. Yeah.

MR. HOFFMAN: When was it? Was it during the Donald report, the Donald investigation, or

when did you guys really take a look at your enterprise?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: It was concurrent that we were looking at that.

MR. HOFFMAN: Okay. Concurrent with the Donald report?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. FARAM: When do you think you'll have a way ahead for Mayport? There's a lot of folks down there wondering, you know, the mixes, all that?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Uh-huh.

MR. FARAM: All the options came out earlier this year.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. FARAM: And there were a lot of folks pointing toward the end of the year in a sort of a homeporting thing. You were looking at how everything was dispersed.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. FARAM: Is that, is that study done of your dispersion of forces?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: No, that aspect is not yet done. Still looking at it because I believe that it's important that as we make decisions and, as you know, Mayport has the environmental piece that's running, but in addition to the environmental piece, I said, you know, if we're going to make decisions, we really need to look at what, strategically what should our laydown be and the staff has been working on that.

MR. BROWN: What's your time frame on that?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: I think in the near term I'll be getting, you know, getting some good ideas as to what some of the options may be.

MR. BROWN: A month, two months? What's near term?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: In the near term, yeah.

MR. NAEGELE: Admiral, we keep you--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: I got one more. Who gets the last shot here?

PARTICIPANT: The boss does.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: He's the guy. Okay.

All right.

PARTICIPANT: My boss is the former Navy Times editor.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Okay. All right.

MR. NAEGELE: You've recently come out with a diversity push--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. NAEGELE: --for admirals in a year that's far off in the distance. We've had diversity issues for as long as I've known, been following the Navy.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. NAEGELE: Which is quite awhile. Nothing has really changed. What's going to change now?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Well, I would say, yeah, I would say that when you say--I recently came out with a diversity push. I think if you go back and look at my guidance when I came in, you know that is part of who I am. And the desire to have our Navy and our leadership because quite frankly our Navy is really quite representative of

the national demographic, but when you get into the officer corps, senior enlisted, and our senior civilian executives, it does not reflect the current demographic nor does it reflect an increasingly diverse society that we're going to see 20, 30, 40 years from now.

I mean those are the demographic trends in the country. That's what is happening. And, you know, my thrust is that we need to be developing an officer corps that's representative of the nation. I believe that's important.

And our ability to attract and recruit and then retain young men and women of underrepresented minorities, I believe, is very important for our future.

MR. NAEGELE: But nothing has--I mean you're not the first CNO to say so.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Right.

MR. NAEGELE: And there has not been a significant change and the blow back that you get from, you know, your officer corps is, well, that's quotas and, you know, I as a middle age white guy,

I'm going to get--

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: I would, I would not characterize having--

MR. NAEGELE: --discriminated against.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: --gotten blow back from my officer corps. I think there were some blogs that talked about it. I don't consider that blow back from my officer corps.

MR. NAEGELE: Well, I mean they may not, they may not blow back. They may not blow back to you, but I mean I think that's--

MR. CAVAS: The whole point is they're not in a position to do that.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Yeah, right.

MR. NAEGELE: They're having conversation or the underlying conversation is, well, why, so is that quotas and am I going to get the back end of the stick here?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: It's not quotas. It's not quotas. As I talk to the leadership of the individual communities in the Navy, to characterize their reaction as blow back is exactly the

opposite. I think our leadership understands the imperative of having to have an officer corps that looks like the nation.

And they're not quotas. It is a matter of looking at what the demographics are going to be, and are we in our Navy developing leaders that will reflect the demographics? Promotion boards will select and promote the best and fully qualified. That's what they do. That's what they have been doing.

But by looking at those who serve and by, you know, is as often the case, and I'm a case in point, of a mentor steering me in a direction that I did not intend to go into, I would not be where I'm sitting today because I would not have had the developmental experiences that I would say caused promotion boards to look at Roughead and say we think this guy should be promoted because of the experiences, because of the opportunities I had to demonstrate, you know, certain traits and competencies. And so that's what we're about, not quotas.

MR. NAEGELE: But how do you actually do that? I mean if it's not quotas, what is it? What is it that's going to reach down and identify this group of sailors who you are going to make into officers who are going to become admirals? How are you going to do that?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: I think it's a question of leadership. It's a question of knowing, you know, where your talent is, and encouraging and mentoring and providing the opportunities that when they appear before a promotion board, the board looks at them for being best and fully qualified, and the board will make its choice. There are no quotas associated with this at all.

I think it's just a question of leadership. I think it's also a question of, you know, are we exposing young men and women in this country to the opportunities that exist in the United States Navy? And I think that we have perhaps not been as aggressive as we should have been.

We have not been taking advantage of, for

example, something that we've done recently, is participating with other college programs that look at young people who are, in the case of the Navy, particularly involved in science, technology, engineering and math.

And do those young men and women even know about the United States Navy? And the opportunities that are there? Do the influencers in our society today know about the opportunities that are in the Navy? And, you know, and we're an all-volunteer force. At the end of the day, the young man or woman is going to have to decide I'm going to go in there or I'm not going to go in there. It's their choice, and that's in the officer and the enlisted ranks.

But all I want to be able to do is to present to young people in the country the opportunities that are there. I look forward to expanding ROTC units in universities strong in science, technology, engineering and math, where there are underrepresented minorities.

I look forward--

MR. NAEGELE: Where? But I mean, in general, those are fields that are underrepresented in minorities.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Absolutely.

MR. NAEGELE: So how is that going to solve your problem?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: It will solve my problem because if a young man or woman is looking at going with Company X, who may be a physics major, or becoming a nuclear submariner, at least I want them to be aware that, hey, that's a pretty neat thing to do.

Absent that, they're going with Company X. So, you know, that's where we have to go, and to be able to capture young people with the excitement and the opportunity that is available in the Navy. So as they begin to think about their futures and, quite frankly, when you get into some of the higher technology fields, if you are not in high school preparing yourself and getting a good foundation in science and mathematics, you're going to have a hard time getting into and enjoying STEM in college

and coming away with a degree.

So I think, you know, there are a couple of components to what we're doing with regard to diversity. One is from a leadership perspective, taking a look at our young leaders and again developing them in a very positive way, but then the other one is really getting out and letting young people in the country see what we're about, because, you know, I maintain this, and I believe it strongly, that there is nothing more satisfying or more exciting than being an officer in the United States Navy.

You know it's as good as it gets. And to be able to let young people see that. If they stay for a career, wonderful. If they come in and they serve and then they go back into civilian life, that's wonderful, too. But, you know, they will never forget the opportunities they had, the ability to lead others and influence others, because it just doesn't get any better.

I mean we give our young people, officer and enlisted, more opportunities to lead, more

opportunities to exercise initiative, than in any other walk of life that I've ever seen.

I was in Afghanistan, very remote area, and the PRT commander who happened to be a Navy guy--we lead half the PRTs in Afghanistan--took us to a remote area where they were building a school, and there was a dormitory, there was a schoolhouse, there was a mosque, there was a learning center, and he said I'm going to introduce you to the person that's in charge of this project. It was a second class petty officer and he was building this school. Where else, you know?

MR. CAVAS: Why aren't you making the commercial?

[Laughter.]

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: What?

MR. CAVAS: Why aren't you making the commercial? You should be on the NFL on Sunday.

[Laughter.]

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: That's right. I'll leave that to the pros, you know, but I mean that's what it's about, and I really do believe that 30,

40 years from now, the American people should look at the leadership of its Navy and see itself. It doesn't, that's not the case now.

And if we don't start working on that today, it won't happen. You know right now the Navy has the highest number of African American admirals serving. In the last couple of months, we have had the highest number in history of three-star African American admirals.

MR. NAEGELE: Which is?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Well, it's a rousing number of four, but it has never been that high in the history of the United States Navy. But that's kind of an anomaly because we've had kind of a bubble coming through.

MR. NAEGELE: And there's no one behind?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: And there's no one behind. But I'm not throwing in the towel. We're going to start again and we're going to continue to keep this as a matter of priority for the United States Navy because it is our future.

And it is the way that this Navy has to be

seen by its nation because, as I've said, a nation needs to look at its military and see itself. And that's what it's about.

So I think it's time to go. I've really enjoyed the session.

MR. NAEGELE: We could keep you here for awhile.

MR. BROWN: You've been a good sport.

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: Thanks. Thanks a lot. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:00 a.m., the interview was concluded.]